I’ve had some of this data kicking around for a few days, in some cases a few weeks. Enjoy.
In the May 2016 wave of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology’s Omnibus (the most recent publicly-available wave), respondents were asked (KIIS’ translation from Ukrainian/Russian versions):
If to speak about Ukraine in general, how do you think, in one year from now the situation in Ukraine will be better or worse than now?
- Only 10.6% of Ukrainians think things will be better; 31.3% think it’ll be the same and 47.5% think it’ll be worse.
- People who think Ukraine will be better were more likely to say they’d vote for Bloc Petro Poroshenko (14.5% compared to 7.1% who said the situation will be the same and 3.2% who said it’ll be worse) and Samopomich (8.8% compared to 4.4% who said the situation will be the same and 3.2% who said it’ll be worse).
- Conversely, people who think the situation in Ukraine will be worse were more likely to say they’d vote for the Opposition Bloc (9.1% of those who said the situation’ll be worse, compared to 3.7% who said it’ll be the same and a whopping 0.9% [!!] who said it’ll be better).
- People who think the situation in Ukraine will be worse are less likely to say they’ll vote (28.1% compared to 21.0% same and 13.4% better).
- Young Ukrainians (18 to 29 years old) are more likely than older Ukrainians (13.9%, compared to 8.0% of 60 to 69 year olds and 8.6% of those aged 70+) to think the country will be better.
The sausage fest on the far right
- In the same May 2016 Omnibus just 2.9% of women said they’d vote for a far right party (i.e., Svoboda, Pravyi Sektor or Yarosh’s national whatever), compared to 6.9% of men (4.7% overall). Even with such a relatively small sample size for far-right supporters, this is a statistically significant relationship.
- Same goes for the February 2016 Omnibus, when 2.8% of women and 5.3% of men would vote for a far-right party (3.9% overall)
- The May survey also asked a number of questions about which social issues troubled people the most, asking respondents to choose the top three from a list. “Revival of the Ukrainian nation” was chosen by 4.2% of people –5.2% of men and 3.4% of women.
- No, that’s not a huge difference (a Cramér’s V of .05 for anyone who cares) but it’s still a big enough one to be statistically significant.
- Relevant/unsurprising too: 13.9% of supporters of far-right parties chose “revival of the Ukrainian nation” in their top three compared to 4.2% of all Ukrainians….
- Women were more likely than men (27.9% compared to 21.5% in May 2016; 27.7% compared to 20.3% in February 2016) to say they were undecided, that they didn’t know who they were going to vote for.
- There’s a separate post or article or two buried just in those numbers and others like it. Interpretations and perspectives more than welcomed, particularly from members of the human race who are a) Ukrainian and b) not men.
Depression in Ukraine
Lastly, some data from the 2012 European Social Survey (ESS), the last wave Ukraine took part in. Despite the name, fieldwork actually took place in July and August 2013 for anyone keen to place this data within a very specific pre-Maidan time frame.
This wave of the ESS used a shortened version of the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale – a higher score on the index means you show more depressive symptoms.
Comments, interpretations and questions welcome.